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SUMMARY OF REPLY
Both Respondents, the Board of Oil# Gas & Mining (the "Board")
and BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. ("BHP"), err in their arguments
by assuming that the terms of the Unit Operating Agreement and Unit
Agreement address, much less govern, the main question in this
case—is Petitioner, Sam Oil, Inc. ("Sam Oil") subject to a nonconsent penalty. Sam Oil has appealed the Board's legal conclusion
that those contracts impose a non-consent penalty on Sam Oil. The
Board and BHP argue only that sufficient evidence exists to support
the Board's finding of no exception to the contractual penalty.
Yet both BHP and the Board fail wholly to point to any language in
those contracts which would require the penalty in the first place.
Moreover, both BHP and the Board fail to address the fundamental
concept that a penalty is justified, and BHP can avoid liability,
only if notice and an opportunity to participate

is given.1

Moreover, the Board's factual findings are not supported by the
Record.
In addition, Petitioner questions the standing of the Board
to argue affirmance of its own decisions and the propriety of such.
Finally, no special deference need be given to the Board's findings
or conclusions as the Board has no special expertise with respect

x

The Board argues that creation of the Unit in 1950 gave
notice to Petitioner's predecessors of the drilling of the subject
well and an opportunity to participate. This conclusion was not
made by the Board in its Order nor is it supported by any shred of
evidence in the Record.
1

to contractual interpretation or the law regarding non-consent
penalties.
ARGUMENT
L.

THE BOARD LACKS STANDING TO ARGUE IN THIS MATTER AND ITS BRIEF
SHOULD BE STRICKEN,
Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires

that

"In each case, the

agency

shall be

named

respondent,"

However, that requirement does not necessarily mean that the Board
has standing to present arguments in this matter to support its own
ruling.
As a general rule a court or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions, not being a party to its
proceedings, and not having any legal interest in
maintaining its determination, is not a party aggrieved
by a judgment or order reversing its own proceedings, and
is not entitled to appeal from such judgment or order,
or to be heard on such appeal, under a statute which in
general terms authorizes an appeal by any party
aggrieved.
4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §234.
Utah's

Administrative

Procedures

Act,

Utah

Code

Ann.

§63-46b-l, et seq. (1990), does not provide the agency, from which
the appeal is taken, with standing.

Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules

of Appellate Procedure requires that the agency be named as a
respondent, but does not address the agency's standing to appeal.
Sam Oil can only suggest that the purpose for naming the agency is
one of notice and simplicity since it should be determined by the
Court whether an agency has standing.

If the agency has no

standing that matter should be brought to the Court's attention by
2

a motion to strike.

There are no reported Utah decisions dealing

with this issue.
The issue has been addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Continental

Oil

Company

v.

373 P.2d 809 (N. Mex. 1962)

Oil

Conservation

Commission,

In that case, the Oil Conservation

Commission had been denied the right to actively participate in an
appeal of its gas proration order to the trial court.
Mexico

court

recognized

the

distinction

between

administrative function and its judicial function.

an

The New
agency's

With respect

to the former, the agency acts to represent the public's interests
and is therefore a proper party to an appeal.

In the latter case,

the agency sits as a court in resolution of private disputes
between parties.

If no public interest is being protected or

forwarded by the agency, it is not a proper party to an appeal.2
This matter was brought before the Board by Sam Oil seeking
an accounting of revenues produced from a well operated by BHP
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9

(1989).

The statute is

"a unique conservation statute in that it provides a forum for
Board

resolution

of

production

payment

and

royalty

interest

disputes between private parties." D. Dragoo and R. Storey, Utah's

2

"Thus, in regard to quasi-judicial agencies with simply the
functions of finding facts and applying the law to the facts, and
where no statute provides otherwise, the courts have held that the
agency is without right to appeal from such decision, the
administrative agency being in no different position from a court
or judge which has rendered a decision."
2 Am. Jur. 2d
Administrative Law S774 (1962).
3

Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1983, 5 JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW &
POLICY 49, 65. The statute was a re-enactment of a prior similar
provision that "involved the Board in private contractual disputes
in which the state had no identifiable interest.

That remedy was

separate and apart from the Board's activities regulating the
efficient production of the State's oil and gas resources."

Id.

No public interest, other than swift adjudication of private
rights, is involved here.

The question presented to the Board

concerns only entitlement to money as between two private parties.
The Board was not asked to apply any statute or rule to this
controversy until it had first determined that the failure to pay
Sam Oil was without reasonable justification.
§40-6-9.

The Board considered only the contract between the

parties and common law principles.
brought

Utah Code Ann.

this

matter

before

a

Indeed, Sam Oil could have

trial

court

of

this

state.

Accordingly, the Board was acting solely in a judicial role and
should not be allowed to participate in this appeal.

By separate

motion, Sam Oil has respectfully requested that the Board's Brief
be stricken and not considered by the Court.
BJL

NEITHER THE UNIT AGREEMENT NOR THE UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT
PURPORT TO GOVERN THE IMPOSITION OF A NON-CONSENT PENALTY ON
A PARTY WHO JOINS THE UNIT AFTER A WELL IS COMMENCED,
Both the Board and BHP premise their entire arguments and

positions on the premise that either the Unit Agreement or the Unit
Operating Agreement, as amended, require the imposition of a

4

penalty on Sam Oil. They do not argue that imposition of a penalty
is based on anything other than those two agreements. However, the
Board and BHP fail to address the total absence of any provisions
in the Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement which even
address this situation, much less justify the imposition of a nonconsent penalty on Petitioner.

The only provision in either

agreement addressing a non-consent penalty is Section 9 of the Unit
Operating Agreement.

(Ex. 16; Add. "D" 27-28)3

That provision

permits a non-consent penalty only when notice is given containing
specifics of a proposed action such as drilling a well.
penalty

is

only

allowed

under

those

circumstances.

The

It is

uncontested that no such notice was given to Sam Oil or its lessor.
Nor does the Unit Agreement govern this dispute. Both BHP and
the Board refer to Section 27 of the Unit Agreement.

(R. 248-9)

That provision concerns only the process of joinder and does not
address any penalty or other aspects of the allocation of costs and
revenues.

Indeed, the Bureau of Land Management, the governing

federal agency, stated before the Board that it has no interest in
the allocation of the costs and revenues among working interest
owners.

(R. 203-210)

Contrary to BHP's belief, this case involves much more than
factual questions.

Indeed, it is the Board's error on the

3

Addenda references are to the Addenda to Sam Oil's principal
brief.
5

application of the agreements that has brought on the misdirected
discussion regarding an "exception" to the imposition of a penalty
and the ensuing dispute regarding what Sam Oil knew and when it
knew it.

The Board erred when it decided that as a general rule

the Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreements (both attached as
addenda to the Board's Brief) required the imposition of a penalty
on Sam Oil.

Those contracts do not address the imposition of a

penalty on a party in a unit who joins the unit after it is created
and wells are drilled. Notably, neither BHP nor the Board cite any
authority supporting the Board's decision.

Neither the Board nor

BHP refute Mr. Lear's expert testimony that (i) subsequent joinder
was not addressed at all in the Unit Operating Agreement, the sole
contract which addresses a non-consent penalty (TR1. 121), and that
(ii) absent notice, no penalty is appropriate unless fairness would
require a penalty, i.e. some equitable substitute for notice exists
such as actual knowledge—the "equitable exception" of which Mr.
Lear spoke and of which the Board and BHP are so utterly confused
(TR1. 123-4).
Accordingly, for a penalty to have been properly imposed under
the agreement,
required.

notice

and

an opportunity

to participate

are

See, Section 9 of the Unit Operating Agreement and

Add. "D" 27-29. Not only does the Unit Operating Agreement require
notice with respect to parties to the Agreement, but the common law
and notions of due process require the same in the absence of an

6

agreement.
avoid

that

Either view of Sam Oil's position requires notice. To
result

BHP,

not

Sam

Oil,

must

show

equitable

considerations which would justify a penalty.
The Board and BHP ignore the express terms of the agreements
and argue that a penalty is equitable based on a presumption that
the Unit could not have been created without notice to all parties
owning land within the geographic area of the Unit, and that Sam
Oil and its predecessors in interest, therefore, must have received
notice and refused an opportunity to join the Unit denying the
thirty years prior to this dispute.

This argument fails for a

number of reasons.
First, there is no evidence that the regulation cited by the
Board and BHP (43 C.F.R. §3181.3) was in existence in 1950 when the
Unit was created.

Second, there is no evidence that Sam Oil's

predecessors were actually given notice and refused to join as is
required by the regulation cited by the Board and BHP. Third, the
Unit Operating Agreement requires a specific notice in writing with
specific information upon which a party can make an intelligent
decision to participate in the drilling of a well.

The "notice"

argued by the Board does not come close to meeting the specifics
of the notice required by the Agreement.
Fourth, the argument lacks contractual logic.

On the one

hand, the Board argues that since Sam Oil was not a party to the
Unit Operating Agreement prior to commencing the Well, BHP had no

7

contractual duty to give Sam Oil or its lessor notice. Yet on the
other hand, even though Sam Oil was not a party to the Unit
Operating Agreement, the Board argues that the penalty in the
Agreement should be imposed.

This argument foists the burden of

the penalty on Sam Oil without the benefit of the contractual
notice requirement.

BHP can not have it both ways.

Finally, BHP had notice of Sam Oil's request to join the Unit
and participate in the subject Well. Yet BHP did nothing to advise
Sam Oil that it would be subject to a penalty or otherwise
condition

Sam Oil's

joinder on the imposition of a penalty.

Accordingly, the presumed "notice" argued by the Board, if there
ever was any, is not notice sufficient to justify a penalty.

BHP

could have protected itself early on by creatively dealing with an
unusual

situation

and

allowing

Sam

Oil's

participation

and

accepting its share of the costs up front, contingent on joining
the Unit.

Instead, BHP lamely argues that its was only following

the rules set by the federal government; which in fact set no such
rules.
The Board's lengthy discussion of the differences between
federal and state unitization or pooling terminology does nothing
to help solve the questions presented in this case.

The Board's

argument is a distinction without a difference given that the
federal government is not concerned with the allocation of costs
and revenues. A more appropriate standard for that resolution are

8

the fundamental principles of fairness and due process which are
not dependent on any federal/state distinction.

The authorities

and arguments discussed in Sam Oil's Brief, based on those notions,
are applicable and controlling.
Sam Oil is not required to show any exception to the contracts
since those contracts do not deal with the situation. The Board's
fundamental error

is its conclusion that the Unit Operating

Agreement states a "general rule." Contracts do not state general
rules; they state specific rules that govern the actions of the
parties.

The contracts in this case contain no specific rules

governing this situation.

Common law states general rules.

In

this case, common law requires that notice and an opportunity to
participate be given before a penalty is imposed.

Sam Oil is not

asking that it participate for free. It expressed its willingness
to pay its share of costs at an early stage.

It is only asking

that it not be subject to a penalty when it had no real opportunity
to avoid it.
L.

SAM OIL HAD NO KNOWLEDGE PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE WELL
WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE EQUITABLY FOR THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY
THE UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT OR LAW.
Most of the dispute with respect to the Board's findings

concern what Sam Oil knew and when it knew it. The essence of the
two express findings of the Board (Finding No.'s 3 and 4; R. 448;
Add. "A" 3) and the implicit finding that Sam Oil purposefully
delayed ratification ("The ratification was not signed until well

9

after it was received and after the well had been completed.")
(TR1. 281; Add. "C" 11), are the main focus of Sam Oil's appeal of
the Board's factual findings.

Sam Oil has attacked those express

and implied findings of fact since it is clear that the Board
relied on them in dismissing Sam Oil's petition.
The Board has argued

first that those

findings are not

necessary to support the Board's Orders (Board's Brief at 32).4
Then the Board argues that it made its findings based on its
conclusion that Sam Oil's principal witness, Steven Malnar, was
not credible.

However, the record lacks any evidence to dispute

Mr.

testimony

Malnar's

findings.

Those

and

findings

to
must

support
be

the

Board's

supported

by

disputed

substantial

evidence, not just a disbelief of testimony in the absence of
supporting evidence. Moreover, the supposed "egregious samples of
testimony" (Board's Brief at 32-33) do not evidence any lack of
credibility.5

4

If that statement is correct, the Court should ignore those
findings and decide this case assuming that no evidence supports
these findings.
5

As expressed above, Sam Oil has significant concern with the
propriety of the quasi-judicial body appealed from, the Board,
arguing before the appellate court that it considered witnesses to
not be credible. Mr. Malnar frequently appears before the Board.
It is impossible for Sam Oil to ascertain whether the Board's
disbelief of Mr Malnar is based solely on his testimony in this
matter or may be based on other matters. Accordingly, Sam Oil
believes it is prejudicial for the Board to take an adversarial
role in interpreting and arguing the record in this case. In any
other case, would the appellate court permit a juror or the trial
judge to argue the credibility of witnesses on appeal?
10

BHP convinced the Board, and would have this Court believe,
that the evidence shows that Sam Oil intentionally delayed joinder
or commitment in order to obtain knowledge regarding the subject
well prior to committing.
conclusion.

The evidence does not support that

First, as argued in Sam Oil's Brief and not refuted

by the Board or BHP, Sam Oil could not have joined the Unit any
earlier than it did due to delays by the Unit Operator, Rio Bravo
Oil Company, in forwarding the necessary joinder documents to Sam
Oil.

Indeed, the Well was completed before Sam Oil even received

those documents.

The Well was completed on January 16, 1984

(Finding No. 9, Add. "A" 4); Sam Oil received the documents on
January 9, 1984 (R. 395). Second, Sam Oil had no knowledge of the
success of the well prior to signing the ratification documents and
joining the Unit. Mr. Malnar had been told that the well was good,
but that characterization is inconclusive. Indeed, BHP admits that
it had no idea what Mr. Malnar knew.

(TR1. 223-224)

Likewise, Sam Oil did not know of the unleased Robertson
acreage in May of 1983 or prior to commencement of the drilling of
the Well.

In May 1983 Mr. Malnar discovered that land in the Unit

was subject to a Tenneco Oil Company lease. (TR1. 79; R. 396-7)
It was not until September 1983 that Mr. Malnar discovered the
unleased acreage of Hazel Robertson and obtained the first lease
from her on September 29, 1983.

(R. 396-7; TR1. 48) Accordingly,

Mr. Malnar did not even have any rights to assert prior to

11

commencement of the Well on September 11, 1983. If Mr. Malnar knew
in May 1983 of the unleased Robertson acreage, why would he have
risked not being able to convince Ms. Robertson to lease if he had
planned to sit back and wait to see the results of the Well.

Why

would he not have waited until after the Well was completed to seek
joinder? Why would he have contacted BHP before completion? These
questions show the weakness in the Board's factual findings.
No evidence exists to suggest, much less prove, that Mr.
Malnar had any knowledge of the Well proposal prior to September
11, 1983, or that production from the proposed Well would possibly
benefit the Robertson property since it was located quite some
distance from the Well site in another section of land.6
This Court must remember that it is undisputed that neither
Mr. Malnar nor Ms. Robertson were contacted with any proposal to
drill the Well.

Once Mr. Malnar acquired the lease for Sam Oil,

in October 1983 he diligently contacted all parties who might give
him information concerning participation in the Unit and any wells
in the Unit.

(Ex.'s 2 and 4) The unavoidably delayed ratification

6

BHP suggests that Mr. Malnar testified that he learned about
deep wells in the Unit prior to September 11, 1983. (BHP's Brief
at 11) Even the language quoted by BHP shows Mr. Malnar did not
know where any well was proposed and that a lot of wells were
drilling. Moreover, Mr. Malnar testified "I believe Don Johnson
told me prior to this that there was a possibility of some deep
wells being drilled in the Roosevelt Unit."
(TR1 81, emphasis
added) The "this" referred to is Mr. Malnar's discussions with Ms.
Robertson during negotiations of the second lease in November 1983.
(See Sam Oil's Brief at 28-29)
12

process followed.
The totality of the facts before the Court do not support the
Board's findings.

It is incredible to believe that Mr. Malnar

could have masterminded a scheme as elaborate as that attributed
to him by the Board and BHP.

Too many other actors were involved

(Ms. Robertson, Rio Bravo Oil Company, BHP and Sam Oil's title
researcher, to name a few) and too much risk existed.

Each of the

supposed samples of incredibility, or support for the Board's
findings argued by the Board and BHP, has an equal or better
explanation in light of the whole record.

Mr. Malnar simply

stumbled across a leasing opportunity and acted diligently to
participate in the Unit.
doing.

The timing was not of his design or

He was merely following "the rules."

While BHP and the Board may attack and twist Mr. Malnar's
testimony to suit their needs, their arguments are most incredible
in the face of the total absence of any evidence or testimony in
the record supporting their arguments.

BHP produced only one

witness, Jerry Bair, who admittedly had no personal knowledge of
any facts whatsoever.

BHP relies solely on its cross-examination

of Mr. Malnar and its improper conclusions therefrom.

If Mr.

Malnar were not a credible witness, his testimony should not be
considered.

If his testimony is not considered, there is no

testimony supporting the Board's decision.

Sam Oil submits that

such logic does not produce the "substantial evidence" required to

13

support the Board's findings.

Accordingly, this Court should

reverse those findings.
Us.

NO SPECIAL DEFERENCE NEED BE GIVEN TO THE BOARD'S CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW.
Both the Board and BHP have argued that this Court must defer

to the Board's legal conclusions due to its expertise.

Sam Oil

submits that the Board has no special expertise in deciding matters
concerning private contractual disputes.

This matter did not

require the Board to exercise any special expertise regarding oil
and gas reserves, geographic information or production information.
The question before the Board was simple, did the contracts between
the parties require the imposition of a non-consent penalty on Sam
Oil?

By its own admission, the Board did not even reach the

question

of

applying

the

applicable to this matter.

statute

(Utah

Code

Ann.

§40-6-9)

(Conclusion No. 5; R. 451)

The fact

that Sam Oil could have properly brought this matter in a trial
court

instead of before the Board evidences that no special

expertise is needed.
Moreover,

the

Board

did

not

exercise

an

administrative

function in this case; its role was purely judicial. Granted, some
understanding of oil and gas law is helpful to the resolution of
this matter. However, acquiring that understanding is nothing that
wouldn't be asked of any judicial body.

There is nothing special

about the constitution of the Board that suggests that its members
have any more expertise in deciding contract disputes than does
14

this Court. For this Court to grant any degree of deference to the
Board's legal conclusions, this Court must conclude that it is not
as capable as the Board in interpreting the common law concerning
contractual disputes in the area of oil and gas law.

Sam Oil

submits that is not the case.
Finally, BHP's argument that the Board has special expertise
in this matter is wholly inconsistent with its position taken
before the Board. Prior to the August 24, 1989, hearing before the
Board, BHP filed a federal interpleader action and sought an order
from the Federal District Court staying the Board hearing on
jurisdictional

grounds;

(R. 221-317; TR1. 36)

that

motion

for

stay

was

denied.

BHP argued that this dispute concerns

contractual issues as to the effect of the non-consent provision
in the agreements between the parties. (TR1. 13)

BHP sought to

exclude those issues from the Board's consideration.

The Board,

however, ruled that it had discretion to hear contractual disputes
as an adjunct to its authority under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.
(TR1. 40-41).

BHP's argument that the Board had some special

expertise in resolution of these contractual issues is absolutely
contrary to its prior position.

BHP should be estopped from now

arguing that the Board has some special expertise requiring this
Court's deference.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental err committed by the Board was its legal

15

conclusion that Sam Oil was subject to a non-consent penalty as a
"general rule" without any basis existing therefor in the contract
between the parties. Sam Oil does not need to show any "exception"
to avoid a non-consent penalty; no penalty was applicable in the
first case.

Sam Oil complied with every request in joining the

Unit and seeking an opportunity to participate in the Well, only
to be told it had to pay a 200% bonus to BHP.

Sam Oil had no

knowledge of this penalty going in. BHP could have taken a number
of steps to protect its interests.

It could have objected to Sam

Oil's joinder, required that Sam Oil's joinder be conditioned on
acceptance of the penaltyr or accepted Sam Oil's proportionate
share of the costs of drilling, completing and equipping the Well
up front, contingent on admission to the Unit.

Sam Oil did not

sleep on its rights; rather, BHP took advantage of a situation to
reap a windfall from Sam Oil's share of production.
Fundamental principles of due process and fairness require
that the Board's Orders be reversed and that the Board be directed
to enter an Order finding Sam Oil entitled to its share of revenues
and requiring BHP to justify its withholding of payment of those
revenues, subject to the remedies and penalties prescribed under
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.
DATED January 16, 1991.

ANDERSON & WATKINS

Steven W. Dougheigjfrf fesq.
Attorneys for Sam Oil, Incl, Petitioner
16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class, postage pre-paid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
this 16th day of January, 1991 to the following;
John P. Harrington, Esq,
Alan A. Enke, Esq,
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 S. Main #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R. Paul Van Dam, Esq.
Thomas A, Mitchell, Esq.
Attorney General of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

k:SAM88170\0113ropl.brf

17

